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I. INTRODUCTION

Trademarks surround us in everyday life. Whether choosing between CocaCola or Pepsi at the grocery store, watching commercials for Ford and Chevy
trucks, listening to a Cee Lo Green song about X-Box and Atari, or watching
James Bond drive an Aston Martin in an exciting chase scene, people view and
interact with trademarks on a daily basis. It is unsurprising, then, that content
creators seek to use trademarks in expressive works-whether it be movies,
television shows, video games, works of visual art, or books. Perhaps equally
unsurprising are efforts made by trademark holders to control and define how
and when their marks may be used. Ultimately, the courts have been left with
the unenviable task of balancing the public interest in free speech against the
rights of markholders within the framework of the Lanham Act.
This Note provides general background information on the development of
trademark law before focusing on the confusion surrounding the Ninth
Circuit's adoption and application of the Rogers test-perhaps the most wellknown test for resolving disputes between free speech and trademark
protection. Ultimately, this Note argues that the decision by some Ninth
Circuit district courts to import elements of the traditional test for infringement
into the Rogers test unnecessarily confuses the law and threatens to create a
chilling effect on content creators desiring to use marks in expressive works.
II. BACKGROUND
A. THE LANDSCAPE OF TRADEMARK LAW

1. Basic Trademark Prindples. As defined by the Lanham Act, a trademark is
"any word, name, symbol, or device, or any combination thereof' used by a
manufacturer or seller "to identify and distinguish his or her goods, including a
unique product, from those manufactured or sold by others and to indicate the
source of the goods, even if that source is unknown."1 A similar concept, trade
dress, applies to the distinctive packaging used for a product.2 A trademark
might be thought of as a commercial signature, certifying that the product
bearing the mark originates with a particular manufacturer or seller. This
certification of origin, when viewed in the commercial context, provides
benefits to both consumers and manufacturers.

1 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (2006).
2

Id.§ 1125(a)(1).
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For consumers, trademarks are reliable indicators of source that reduce the
likelihood that unwanted products will be purchased.3
Consumers may
purchase a red can bearing the name and logo of Coca-Cola without worrying
that they are, in fact, purchasing a Pepsi. Less obviously, trademarks lower the
search costs for consumers trying to find what they want in the marketplace. 4
As consumers come to associate Coca-Cola with its red packaging and
distinctive cursive script, they may quickly and efficiently find and purchase a
case of Coca-Cola without looking at each and every case of soda at the grocery
store.
For manufacturers, trademarks permit the creation of goodwill within the
marketplace. 5 By maintaining a consistent level of quality in their products or*
services, manufacturers can develop a reputation with consumers who come to
view the manufacturers' marks as guarantees of a consistent level of quality. 6
For example, a consumer who has a favorable experience with a Dell desktop
computer may later decide to purchase a Dell laptop, trusting that it will exhibit
the same general level of quality.
In short, trademarks convey a great deal of economic information accurately
and quickly. With a quick glance at a trademark, a consumer can confidently
determine the origin and expected quality of a product and distinguish it from
different but similar products. Such confidence would be seriously undermined
without at least some legal protection of trademarks. 7 Like a person's signature,
a manufacturer's trademark would be meaningless as a guarantee of quality if
competitors could affix it to their own goods and pass them off as originating
with the markholder. 8 At its most basic, modern trademark law is designed to
prevent the problems caused by such "passing-off' in the marketplace. 9
Under federal law, the Lanham Act permits marklholders to sue for the
unauthorized use of their marks when such use is likely to create confusion as

3 WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A.
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 166-68 (2003).
4 Id.

POSNER,

THE

ECONOMIC

STRUCTURE

OF

5 See generally Stacey L. Dogan & Mark A. Lemley, Trademarks and Consumer Search Costs on the
Internet, 41 Hous. L. REv. 777, 787-92 (2004) (discussing the general economic framework of
trademark protection).
6 LANDES & POSNER, supra note

3.

7 Vincent Chiappetta, Trademarks:More Than Meets the Eye, 2003 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 35,
59-61.
8 Id.

9 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28 (2003) ("The Lanham
Act was intended to make 'actionable the deceptive and misleading use of marks,' and 'to protect
persons engaged in... commerce against unfair competition.'" (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1127

(2006))).
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to the "affiliation, connection, or association" of the markholder or the "origin,
sponsorship, or approval" of the offered product. 10 Trademark infringement
analysis focuses on whether there is a likelihood of consumer confusion." In
short, the relevant inquiry is whether the unauthorized use of the mark
threatens to lead consumers to mistakenly believe that the markholder is
associated with the product or service. 12 Such a determination primarily
involves a fact-based application of several non-exclusive "likelihood of
confusion" factors which vary from circuit to circuit.' 3 The Ninth Circuit, for
example, evaluates the presence of eight factors: (1)the strength of the
plaintiff's mark; (2) the proximity or relatedness of the goods; (3) the similarity
of the marks; (4) the presence of actual consumer confusion; (5) the marketing
channels used; (6) the degree of care customers are likely to exercise in
purchasing the goods; (7) the defendant's intent in using the mark; and (8) the
likelihood of expansion such that both parties will compete in the same
market. 14 Not all factors are weighed equally by the courts, and some may not
apply at all depending on the given facts of a case.' 5
2. Branding and the Modern Trademark. In cases involving the origin of a
product, reliance on consumer confusion as the touchstone for trademark
infringement offers few problems. 16 If a soda company appropriates the CocaCola trademark and trade dress to sell its soda, the proper inquiry is whether
consumers are likely to have been confused into falsely believing that the soda
was actually Coca-Cola. These passing-off claims are, as discussed earlier, at the
7
core of what trademark law was designed to prevent.'

10

15 U.S.C. 1125(a) (2006).

11 Leelanau Wine Cellars, Ltd. V. Black & Red, Inc., 502 F.3d 504, 515 (6th Cir. 2007).
12 Id.
13 See, e.g., KP Permanent Make-Up, Inc. v. Lasting Impression I, Inc., 408 F.3d 596, 602 (9th
Cit. 2005) (" 'Because of the intensely factual nature of trademark disputes, summary judgment is
generally disfavored in the trademark arena.'" (quoting Entrepreneur Media, Inc. v. Smith, 279
F.3d 1135, 1140 (9th Cit. 2002))); see also Barton Beebe, An EmpiricalStudy of the Mulifactor Testsfor
Trademark Infringement, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1581, 1582-85 (2006) (discussing the significant variation
in factors employed by the various circuits to determine the likelihood of confusion).
14 AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogatedin part on other
grounds by Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003).
15 Downing v. Abercrombie & Fitch, 265 F.3d 994, 1008 (9th Cit. 2001).
16 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cit. 2002) ("Limited to this core
purpose-avoiding confusion in the marketplace-a trademark owner's property rights play well
with the First Amendment.").
17 While many scholars have argued persuasively that trademark law, at its inception, was not
overly focused on protecting consumers, it was certainly focused on preventing deceitful business
practices. See Lionel Bently, From Communication to Thing: HistoricalAspects of the Concetuahsation of
Trade Marks as Property, in TRADEMARK LAW AND THEORY: A HANDBOOK OF CONTEMPORARY
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However, modem trademarks serve as more than indicators of origin.
Manufacturers and service providers have harnessed the communicative power
of trademarks through the process of "branding," imbuing marks with
expressive and cultural significance. 18 Beyond guaranteeing a certain level of
quality, trademarks can convey desirable secondary reasons to own products. 19
Branding can suggest to consumers that purchasing a product will make them
healthier, happier, or more interesting.2 0 For example, consumers may be
persuaded by branding that Kashi food will make them healthier, or that Axe
shampoo will make them more attractive to women.
Trademarks, in conjunction with branding, may also convey information
wholly unrelated to the product bearing the mark.21 While consumers might buy
Kashi cereal because they like how it tastes or because it might make them
healthier, they may also decide to purchase items with the Kashi brand to support
Kashi's avowed commitment to environmental stewardship. Trademarks may
even communicate that an individual is part of a special group of people,
encouraging consumers to buy products to display the mark to their peers.2 2 A
person wearing a cap with the Boston Red Sox logo displays to others that she is
a fan of the team. Similarly, the Louis Vuitton and Porsche marks may be
appealing to consumers for their ability to communicate to others that the owner
23
is wealthy or successful.
Branding, in effect, leverages a trademark's communicative ability to exert a
distinctive or even unique impact on the minds of consumers, thus increasing
selling power.24 This differentiation in the minds of consumers goes beyond
the mere recognition that one product originates with one manufacturer while

RESEARCH 3, 5-15 & n.13 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie & Mark D. Janis eds., 2008) (discussing the
early development of trademark law in England); Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundationsof
Trademark Law, 82 NoTRE DAME L. REv. 1839, 1850 (2007).
18 See Thomas D. Drescher, The Traniformation and Evolution of Trademarks-Fomn Signals to
Symbols to Mjtb, 82 TRADEMARK REP. 301, 328 (1992) (discussing the symbolic nature of
trademarks resulting from "a process of mythical attachments by which... marks are made to
refer not only to the product itself, but also to broader cultural themes"); Jerre B. Swann et al.,
Trademarks and Marketing, 91 TRADEMARK REP. 787, 800-03 (2001) (discussing the "emotional and
self-expression benefits" of modern brands as well as their ability to fill social needs).
19 Chiappetta, supra note 7, at 46.
20 Id

21 See id.
(noting the "broader social considerations" communicated by brands).
22 Id.

23Swann et al., supra note 18, at 797.
24 See Frank I. Schechter, The Rational Basis of Trademark Protection, 40 HARv. L. REv. 813, 819
(1927) (opining that trademarks can actually create the goodwill that they convey and thus
"actually sel4 ] the goods'.
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another product originates with another.25 Manufacturers certainly have an
interest in protecting the differentiating power of their trademarks, especially
since cultivating and establishing brand appeal often involves significant
expenditures of time and money. 26 However, these examples evidence the
potential for increasing sales by tapping in consumers' preference for distinctive
products.
The Lanham Act is, in part, responsive to such concerns. Beyond permitting
suits over consumer confusion concerning the origin of a marked product, 15
U.S.C. § 1125 prohibits the use of marks that cause confusion as to the affiliation,
connection, or association with the markholder or as to the sponsorship or
approval of goods or services. 27 The Lanham Act also provides a cause of action
for "trademark dilution," where a use, though not confusing as to the origin or
sponsorship of a product, nonetheless acts to chip away at a famous mark's
distinctive impact on a consumer (dilution by blurring) or draw negative
associations with the mark (dilution by tarnishment). 28 Unlike infringement,
dilution actions do not require the plaintiff to show a likelihood of confusion. 29
However, several exceptions to -dilution liability exist, including fair use, parody,
30
news reporting, and non-commercial uses of a mark.
As the many restrictions on dilution suggest, markholders do not possess
the unfettered right to determine how their marks are used. Courts have carved
out numerous exceptions to trademark infringement liability. A markholder
may not, for example, seek trademark protection if his mark has become the
commonly accepted term for a product or good such that consumers no longer
consider the mark an indicator of origin. 31 The classic trademark "fair use
doctrine" provides a defense when the mark or symbol is used by a defendant

25 See Barton Beebe, Searrh and Persuasion in Trademark Law,103 MICH. L. REv. 2020, 2029-31
(2005) (distinguishing source distinctiveness from "differential distinctiveness," which "refers ...to
the uniqueness of singularity of the mark").
26 Chiappetta, supranote 7, at 57-60.
27

15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (2006).

28 Id § 1125(c) ("[A] mark is famous if it is widely recognized by the general consuming public
of the United States as a designation of source of the goods or services of the mark's owner.").
29 Id.§ 1125(c)(1).
- Id.§ 1125(c)(3).
31 See id. § 1127 (explaining that a mark is "abandoned" if the markholder allows the mark to
become a "generic" term); see also Van Well Nursery, Inc. v. Mony Life Ins. Co., 421 F. Supp. 2d
1321, 1327-28 (E.D. Wash. 2006) ("Even the most distinctive symbols-coined words having no
descriptive or suggestive quality-may become generic if they are adopted by the public as the
name of the product rather than as the mark of the producer. Familiar examples are Aspirin,
Cellophane, and Thermos, all of which were once, but are no longer, trademarks of a single
manufacturer.').
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to describe his own products, as opposed to those of the plaintiffs. 3 2 The
"nominative fair use doctrine," a common law extension of the statutory classic
fair use defense, protects the unauthorized use of a mark when such a use is the
only practical way to identify a product or service, provided that the mark is
used no more than necessary and does not imply sponsorship by the
33
markholder.
3. Trademark Protection and Free Speech. These exceptions to trademark
protection exist because trademark law, unlike patent or copyright law, "does
not exist to reward manufacturers for their innovation in creating a particular
devic." 34 Rather, trademark law, "by preventing competitors from copying 'a
source-identifying mark,' 'reduce[s] the customer's costs of shopping and
making purchasing decisions,' and 'helps assure a producer that it (and not an
imitating competitor) will reap the financial, reputation-related rewards
associated with a desirable product.' 35
This distinction between trademark law and patent and copyright law reflects
the different origins of each form of intellectual property protection. While
congressional authority to enact both patent and copyright laws stems from the
constitutional grant of power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right
to their respective Writings and Discoveries," 36 congressional authority to enact
trademark law is derived from the Commerce Clause.37 Trademark law is thus
less concerned with conferring exclusive rights to markholders than it is with
promoting efficient and competitive markets by providing consumers with more
accurate information-i.e., protecting trademarks as reliable indicators of
source. 38 If the use of a mark, though unauthorized, does not interfere with the
32 See 15 U.S.C. § 1115(b)(4) (2006); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971
F.2d 302, 308 (9th Cir. 1992) ("[mr1he classic fair use case [is] where the defendant has used the
plaintiff's mark to describe the defendant's own product.").
33 New Kids on the Block, 971 F.2d at 308; see also William Spieler, Nominative Fair Use in
Trademark Law:A FairUse Like No Other,J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'Y 780, 786 (noting that
"there is no statutory protection granted to nominative fair use" and otherwise distinguishing
classic and nominative fair use).
34 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 34 (2003) (quoting TrafFix
Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23, 34 (2001) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
35 Id. (quoting Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Prods. Co., 514 U.S. 159, 163-64 (1995)).
36 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, ci. 8.
37 See Trade Mark Cases, 100 U.S. 82, 96-97 (1879) (asserting that federal trademark laws "can
only be valid as a regulation of commerce" and rejecting such a law that reached beyond the
confines of the Commerce Clause); U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3.
38 See Landscape Forms, Inc. v. Columbia Cascade Co., 113 F.3d 373, 379 (2d Cir. 1997)
("Mhe Lanham Act must be construed in the light of a strong federal policy in favor of
vigorously competitive markets, which is exemplified by the Sherman Act and other anti-trust
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communicative function of the mark Within the marketplace, or if the use
implicates other important public interests such as free speech, the justification
39
for protecting the markholder becomes more attenuated.
The tension between the public interest in protecting trademarks and in
protecting free speech is particularly strong because the traits that make marks
so valuable as brand icons also make them convenient and powerful cultural
symbols when used outside the commercial marketplace. 40 Indeed, the
powerful impact of trademarks makes them particularly suited to expressive
works of entertainment, where trademarks may be included to create a sense of
verisimilitude, portray certain characters or events, or serve as well-known
41
cultural symbols.
B. THE ROGERS TEST

1. Or:ginsof the Test. While cognizant of the tension between free speech and
trademark protection, circuit counts differ in how they supplement the
traditional consumer confusion test when marketholder interests conflict with
43
First Amendment free speech rights. 42 The landmark case Rogers v. Grimaldi
established what is perhaps the most famous and widely applied test for
protecting First Amendment interests in the context of trademark law.
In Rogers, famous Hollywood performer Ginger Rogers brought suit against
defendant producers and distributors of a film entitled Ginger and Fred,alleging
that the film's title violated the Lanham Act under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) by

laws."); Elizabeth L. Rosenblatt, Rethinking the Parametersof Trademark Use in Entertainment,61 FLA.
L. REv. 1011, 1022 (2009).
39 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 900 (9th Cir. 2002) ("[W]hen a
trademark owner asserts a right to control how we express ourselves... applying the traditional
[likelihood of confusion] test fails to account for the full weight of the public's interest in free
expression.'); Car-Freshener Corp. v. S.C. Johnson & Son, Inc., 70 F.3d 267, 269 (2d Cir. 1995)
(noting the "great importance" of "protect[rng] the right of society at large to use words or
images in their primary descriptive sense'); New Kids on the Block v. News Am. Publ'g, Inc., 971
F.2d 302, 305 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Throughout the development of trademark law, the purpose of
trademarks remained constant and limited: Identification of the manufacturer or sponsor of a
good or the provider of a service.').
40 Rosenblatt, supranote 38, at 1027.
41 Id. at 1026-27.
42 While many circuits employ some variant of the Rogers test, some do not. See Cardtoons,
L.C. v. Major League Baseball Players Ass'n, 95 F.3d 959, 972-76 (10th Cir. 1996) (balancing
right of publicity interests against First Amendment interests); Anheuser-Busch, Inc. v. Balducci
Publ'ns, 28 F.3d 769, 775-77 (8th Cir. 1994) (balancing the interests after performing likelihood
of confusion analysis).
43 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994 (2d Cir. 1989).
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"creating the false impression that the film was about her or that she sponsored,
endorsed, or was otherwise involved in the film.""4
At trial, Rogers offered survey evidence showing that forty-three percent of
individuals exposed to the film's title associated the film with Rogers and that
twenty-seven percent of those exposed to a promotional advertisement for the
film associated the film with Rogers. 45 Rogers also introduced evidence that the
film's distributor in the United States, MGM, had devised several promotional
schemes tying the film to Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers, though only one was
46
ultimately implemented.
The defendants argued that First Amendment protections for free speech
shielded the film from Rogers's claims. 47 The film itself told the fictional story
of two Italian cabaret performers who imitated Hollywood performers Ginger
Rogers and Fred Astaire. 48 The film's screenwriter, Federico Fellini, submitted
an affidavit claiming that the names "Fred and Ginger" had been chosen as
symbols of hope during a difficult period in Italy, and that the characters in the
film were never intended to resemble or otherwise portray the real Fred Astaire
and Ginger Rogers. 49 Rogers countered that the defendants could have
conveyed this artistic message without infringing on her rights or deceiving the
public.5o
The district court ultimately ruled in favor of the defendants, granting
summary judgment and dismissing the complaint. The court concluded that the
film was a work of artistic expression, not a commercial product, and thus
beyond the scope of the Lanham Act. 5 1 While affirming the judgment on
appeal, the Second Circuit ruled that the Lanham Act could be applied to titles of
expressive works.5 2 Recognizing the commercial nature of many works of
artistic expression, the court acknowledged that consumers could still be
harmed by artistic works with misleading titles.53 Rather than affording titles of
artistic works complete immunity from Lanham Act claims, the Second Circuit

44 Id. at 996-97.
45 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 695 F. Supp. 112, 115 (S.D.N.Y. 1988).
46

Id.

47 Id. at 116.
48

Id. at 114.

49 Id. at 114-15. Fellini was not a party to the suit. Id. at 114.

Id. at 116.
51 Id. at 124.
52 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 997 (2d Cir. 1989) ("In effect, the District Court's ruling
would create a nearly absolute privilege for movie titles, insulating them from Lanham Act claims
as long as the film itself is an artistic work, and the title is relevant to the film's content. We think
that approach unduly narrows the scope of the Act.").
50

53

Id
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held that the Lanham Act "should be construed to apply to artistic works only
where the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion outweighs the public
interest in free expression."5 4 In the context of titles of artistic works, the
Second Circuit stated that balancing these conflicting interests "will normally
not support application of the Act unless the title has no artistic relevance to
the underlying work whatsoever, or, if it has some artistic relevance, unless the
title explicitly misleads as to the source or the content of the work. 55
Applying this standard to the facts of the case, the Second Circuit agreed
with the district court that the Ginger andFredtitle had some artistic relevance to
the content of the fim. 56 They held that the title not only alluded to the
nicknames of the fictional protagonists, but also served as a symbol of
"elegance and class" that the screenwriter contrasted in the film with the
"gaudiness and banality of contemporary television."57 While Rogers argued
that First Amendment protection should apply only if the author has no
alternative way of titling his work without violating the Lanham Act, the court
was unpersuaded, 8 stating that such a "no alternative" standard would provide
5' 9
"insufficient leeway for literary expression.
Having established artistic relevance, the Second Circuit next determined
that the title did not explicitly mislead as to the content or sponsorship of the
film.60 While conceding that at least some people reading the title might think
that the film was about Fred Astaire and Ginger Rogers, the interest in
protecting artistic expression, 61 outweighed the risk of consumer confusion.
The Second Circuit reasoned that, unlike commercial products, which
consumers expect to be named accurately and to which courts apply the
Lanham Act rigorously, titles of artistic works are not taken so literally by
consumers. 62 Only an explicitly misleading title, such as "The True Life Story
of Ginger and Fred," would pose a sufficient threat of consumer confusion to
permit an action under the Lanham Act.63 Accordingly, the Second Circuit

54

Id. at 999.

5 Id.
56

Id. at 1001.

57 Id.

58 Id at 998-99.
59 Id at 999.
60 Id. at 1001-02.
61 Id ("To the extent that there is a risk that the title will mislead some consumers as to what
the work is about, that risk is outweighed by the danger that suppressing an artistically relevant
though ambiguous title will unduly restrict expression.").
62 Id. at 1000 ("[M]ost consumers are well aware that they cannot judge a book solely by its tide
any more than by its cover.").
63

Id
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found the title protected under the First Amendment, barring application of the
Lanham Act. 64
Rogers v. Grimaldi effectively established a two-pronged test to determine
whether a title of an artistic work is entitled to First Amendment protection in
Lanham Act trademark infringement cases. Under the Rogers test, a defendant
must show that (a) the title of the work has some artistic relevance to the
underlying work; and (b) that the title is not explicitly misleading as to the
source or content of the work.65 In addition, the Rogers test may only be applied
66
to noncommercial uses of a mark.
2. CircuitAdoption and Development of the Rogers Test. While originating in the
Second Circuit, the Rogers test has since been adopted in some form or fashion
by the Fifth, Sixth, Ninth, and Eleventh Circuits. 6 While the Second Circuit
initially limited the Rogers test to titles of artistic works, it has since been applied
in some circuits to uses of marks in artistic works generally. 68 However, the
actual application of the Rogers test has varied widely across the different
circuits, even within the Second Circuit itself. Less than a year after Rogers v.
Grimaldi,the Second Circuit revisited the Rogers test in Cliffs Notes, Inc. v. Bantam
Doubleday Dell Publishing G utp. 69 In Cliffs Notes, the defendant published a book
parodying the Cliffs Notes series of study aids, which provide short synopses of

64Id.at 1001-02.
65 Id.at 999.

66 The generally accepted definition of commercial speech is speech which "does 'no more
than propose a commercial transaction.'" Bolger v. Youngs Drug Prods. Corp., 463 U.S. 60, 66
(1983) (quoting Virginia Pharmacy Bd. v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council, 425 U.S. 748, 762
(1976)). See, e.g., Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, 296 F.3d 894, 906 (9th Cit. 2002) (applying the
Bolger definition of commercial speech in trademark infringement cases); Univ. of Alabama Bd.
of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1276 (11th Cit. 2012) (stating that expressive speech
does "more than 'propos[e] a commercial transaction'" (quoting Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec.
Corp. v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557, 562 (1980))). Determining whether speech is
commercial or not does not appear to cause courts too much difficulty in trademark infringement
cases. Id.
67 See, e.g., Univ. ofAla. Bd.of Trs., 683 F.3d at 1278; Parks v. LaFace Records, 329 F.3d 437,
450-51 (6th Cit. 2003); Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cit. 2002);
Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658, 664-65 (5th Cit. 2000).
68 See E.S.S. Entm't 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008)
(opining that the Rogers test should "apply to the use of a trademark in the body of the work");
ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915, 928 n. 11 (6th Cit. 2003) (noting that the Rogers
test is "generally applicable to all cases involving literary or artistic works"); Cliffs Notes, Inc. v.
Bantam Doubleday Dell Publ'g Grp., 886 F.2d 490, 495 (2d Cit. 1989) ("[W]e hold that the Rogers
balancing approach is generally applicable to Lanham Act claims against works of artistic
expression....").
Notes, 886 F.2d at 490.
69 Cliffs
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literary works routinely read in university literature classes. 0 Cliffs Notes
brought suit under the Lanham Act to enjoin the sale of the books, which used
features of Cliffs Notes' distinctive black and yellow trade dress, arguing that
the parody would confuse consumers into thinking that Cliffs Notes had
published or sponsored the books.71 The district court found the Rogers test
inapplicable and applied a traditional likelihood of confusion test, ultimately
issuing a preliminary injunction on the sale of the books. 72
On review, the Second Circuit extended the Rogers test to cover artistic
expression in general, not just titles.7 3 The Second Circuit's application of the
test, however, differed markedly from that in Rogers itself. In endorsing the
Rogers test as the appropriate method "to weigh the public interest in free
expression against the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion,"74 the
Second Circuit stated that the Rogers test "takes into account the ultimate test in
trademark law, namely, the likelihood of confusion as to the source of the
goods." 75 The Second Circuit then proceeded to determine whether the
defendant's use was likely to cause confusion without specifically mentioning
the likelihood of confusion factors used within the Second Circuit. 76 The
Second Circuit ultimately held that the defendant's use did not create a strong
likelihood of confusion and vacated the preliminary injunction. 77
The Second Circuit again employed a likelihood of confusion analysis in
connection with the Rogers test in Twn Peaks Productions, Inc. v. Publicaions
Internaional,Ltd.78 Determining that the defendant's use was artistically relevant
enough to satisfy the first prong of the Rogers test, the Second Circuit remanded
the case to determine whether consumer confusion was likely under the Second
79
Circuit's factors.
In both cases, the Second Circuit's application of the Rogers test appears to
have been less than complete. While the Second Circuit applied the first prong
in both cases to determine whether the trademark use was artistically relevant, it
then employed a likelihood of confusion test to weigh the public interest in free

70 Id. at 491-92.
71 Id. at 492.
73

Id. at 493.
Id. at 495.

74

Id. at 494.

72

75 Id. at

495 (quoting Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Nintendo Co., 746 F.2d 112, 115 (2d Cir.

1984)).
76 Id. at

495-97.

77 Id. at 497.
78

Twin Peaks Prods., Inc. v. Publ'ns Int'l, Ltd., 996 F.2d 1366 (2d Cir. 1993).

79 Id at 1379.
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speech against the public interest in avoiding consumer confusion.80 In Rogers,
8
no such analysis took place. 1
However, the Second Circuit is not alone in employing a likelihood of
confusion analysis in conjunction with the Rogers test. In Westchester Media v.
PRL USA Holdings, Inc.,82 the Fifth Circuit held that the second prong of the
Rogers test required a likelihood of confusion analysis and that only a
"particularly compelling" likelihood of confusion would overcome First
Amendment protections.83
The Sixth and Eleventh Circuits, in contrast, have applied the Rogers test in a
manner more similar to its original incarnation. In ETW Corp. v.fireb Publishing
Inc., the Sixth Circuit employed the Rogers test in a trademark infringement case
involving the unauthorized use of professional golfer Tiger Woods's name and
likeness in a painting depicting several champions of the famous Masters golf
85
tournament. 84 After extending the Rogers test to artistic works in general, the
Sixth Circuit determined that the use had artistic relevance and did not explicitly
mislead as to the source or sponsorship of the work.8 6 The dissent contended
that the Rogers test should not have been expanded beyond its original
application to artistic tiles and argued for the application of a likelihood of
confusion analysis to determine whether a use was misleading, citing Cliffs Notes,
Inc. extensively. 8 The majority specifically rejected this approach. 88
Similarly, the Eleventh Circuit recently adopted the Rogers test in a case
involving the unauthorized depiction of the University of Alabama football
team's uniforms in paintings, prints, and calendars.8 9 After determining that the
defendant's use contained some artistic relevance, the Eleventh Circuit found
no evidence that the defendant artist had "ever marketed an unlicensed item as
'endorsed' or 'sponsored' by the University, or otherwise explicitly stated that
such items were affiliated with the University." 90 While acknowledging that
some members of the public might incorrectly assume that the University was
80 Twin Peaks Prods., Inc., 996 F.2d at 1366, 1379; Cliffs Notes, 886 F.2d at 490.
81 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1001-02 (2d Cir. 1989).

82 Westchester Media v. PRL USA Holdings, Inc., 214 F.3d 658 (5th Cit. 2000).
at 664-65 (quoting Twin Peaks, 996 F.2d at 1379) (internal quotation omitted).
83 Id.
84 ETW Corp. v. Jireh Publ'g, Inc., 332 F.3d 915 (6th Cir. 2003).
85 Id. at 928 n.11.
86 Id. at 937.
87 Id.at 940-41, 943-49.

88 Id.at 937 ("We disagree with the dissent's suggestion that a jury must decide where the
balance should be struck and where the boundaries should be drawn between the rights conferred
by the Lanham Act and the protections of the First Amendment.").
89 Univ. of Ala. Bd. of Trs. v. New Life Art, Inc., 683 F.3d 1266, 1278-79 (11th Cit. 2012).
90 Id
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associated with the defendant's work, the Eleventh Circuit held that this risk
was "outweighed by the interest in artistic expression."91
C. THE ROGERS TEST IN THE NINTH CIRCUIT

1. The Barbie Cases. While the circuits have applied the Rogers test in different
and perhaps contradictory ways, the application of the text within the Ninth
Circuit has proven particularly confusing. The Rogers test as originally adopted
by the Ninth Circuit in Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc.92 appeared to track the
original application of the test in Rogers v. rimaldi.93 MCA Records involved
Lanham Act claims brought by Mattel, manufacturer of the famous Barbie
doll. 94 Mattel objected to the Danish band Aqua's use of the term Barbie in its
hit song Barbie Girl,95 which poked fun at the doll and the values the defendants
thought she represented. 96 While the district court ruled in the defendant's
favor on other grounds, 97 the Ninth Circuit instead adopted the Rogers test to
decide the case. 98 Applying the first prong of the Rogers test, the Ninth Circuit
determined that the use was artistically relevant.99 The Ninth Circuit also held
that the use did not explicitly mislead as to Mattel's association with the song.100
No likelihood of confusion analysis was provided) 0 '
The Ninth Circuit revisited the Rogers test (and Barbie dolls) in Mattel, Inc. v.
10 2
Walking Mountain Produclions.
In this case, Mattel took exception to the
defendant's production and sale of photographs containing the Barbie doll. 103
Most of these "photos portray[ed] a nude Barbie in danger of being attacked by

91 Id. at 1279 (first alteration in original) (quoting Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 1001 (2d
Cir. 1989)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
92 Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894 (9th Cir. 2002).
93 See id at 901-02 (discussing the facts and policies of Rogers and then "agree[ing] with the
Second Circuit's analysis and adoptrng] the Rogers standard as [their] own").

94 Id at 899.
95
96
97
98

AQUA, Barbie Girl,on AQUARIUM (MCA Records 1997).
MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 901.
Id. at 899.
Id. at 902.
99 Id ("Under the first prong of Rogers, the use of Barbie in the song tide clearly is relevant to

the underlying work, namely, the song itself. As noted, the song is about Barbie and the values
[Defendant] claims she represents.').

100 Id ("The song tile does not explicitly mislead as to the source of the work; it does not,
explicitly or otherwise, suggest that it was produced by Mattel.').
101 Id. at 902 & n.2.
102 Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2008).
103 Id. at 796.
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vintage household appliances."' 10 4 The relevant Lanham Act claims concerned
the use of Barbie in the titles of the photographs and the depiction of the
distinctive Barbie trade dress in the photographs themselves. 10 The defendant,
a self-professed "Artsurdist," claimed that his photographs were "an attempt to
'critique[] the objectification of women associated with [Barbie]....
,'"106
The Ninth Circuit applied the Rogers test to the trademark claims concerning
the use of Barbie in the photographs' titles, but declined to extend the test to
trade dress infringement. 07 The court's analysis substantially followed the
approach set out in MCA Records, concluding that the use of the Barbie
trademark was artistically relevant to the underlying work and did not explicitly
10 8
mislead the consumer as to Mattel's association with the work.
However, unlike in MCA Records, the Ninth Circuit suggested that the Rogers
test only applied to the unauthorized use of marks with transcendent meaning
that had entered the everyday public discourse, quoting language from Judge
Kozinski's opinion in MCA Records.'0 9 According to the court, MCA Records
had determined that the Barbie mark possessed the required cultural
significance to possess transcendent meaning and thus Rogers test protected." 0
2. E.S.S. Entertainment. The Ninth Circuit appeared to discard the cultural
significance requirement from Walking Mountain just five years later in E.S.S.
Entertainment2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc. (E.S.S.)."' In E.S.S., the plaintiff
operator of a strip club in Los Angeles called Play Pen Gentleman's Club filed
suit against Rockstar Games alleging trade dress infringement under the
Lanham Act." 2 According to the plaintiff, Rockstar Games had used the
distinctive logo and trade dress of Play Pen in the game Grand TheftAuto: San
Andreas by including a similar strip club in the game called the Pig Pen." 3 E.S.S.
essentially argued that the similarities between the Pig Pen logo and the

104 Id
105 Id. at 797.
106 Id. at 796-97.

107 Id. at 807-08.
108 Id. at 806-07.
109 See id.("[W]hen marks 'transcend their identifying purpose' and 'enter public discourse and
become an integral part of our vocabulary'... First Amendment protections come into play."
(quoting MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 900)).
110 Id.at 807 ("As we determined in MCA, Mattel's 'Barbie' mark has taken on such a
[transcendent] role in our culture." (citing MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 898-99)).
111See 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir. 2008) (conceding that "Play Pen has little cultural
significance," but nonetheless concluding that its inclusion has "at least 'some artistic relevance.'"
(citing Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989))).
112 Id. at 1097-98.

113Id.at 1097.
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configuration of the building risked leading consumers to believe E.S.S.
sponsored or endorsed the game." 4 Rockstar Games moved for summary
judgment at trial, asserting nominative fair use and First Amendment free
speech defenses." 5
The district court rejected the nominative fair use defense but granted
summary judgment to the defendants on First Amendment grounds, extending
6
the Rogers test to trade dress and trademark use in artistic works." The district
court then determined that the use had artistic relevance and did not explicitly
mislead as to the source or content of the game, employing both prongs of the
Rogers test in tuM." 7 The district court's opinion did not analyze whether the
Play Pen possessed transcendent meaning or had entered into common use in
8
public discourse."
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment on appeal, rejecting E.S.S.'s
argument that the Play Pen had no cultural significance permitting a First
Amendment defense. 1 9 While conceding "that Play Pen ha[d] little cultural
significance," the court noted that "the same could be said about most of
the... establishments in East Los Angeles."' 120 Of greater importance to the
121
court was whether the use was artistically relevant.
Moving to the second prong, the Ninth Circuit found that Rockstar's use
did not explicitly mislead as to the source or content of the game. 122 However,
the Ninth Circuit's application of this prong of the Rogers test differed
significantly from that of the trial court. When discussing whether Rockstar's
use was explicitly misleading, the Ninth Circuit framed "[t]he relevant question
[as] whether the Game would confuse its players into thinking that the Play Pen
is somehow behind the Pig Pen or that it sponsors Rockstar's product."' 123 The
court then determined that Rockstar's use did not present any likelihood of
confusion because no reasonable consumer would think (1) that E.S.S. had

114

Id. at 1098.

11s

Id.

116 E.S.S. Entm't 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1039-40, 1048
(C.D. Cal. 2006).
117 Id. at 1040-48.

Id
119 E.S.S. Entm't 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1101 (9th Cir. 2008).
118

120 Id. at 1100.

121Id. "Under MCA Records and the cases that followed it, only the use of a trademark with 'no
artistic relevance to the underlying work whatsoever' does not merit First Amendment protection."
(quoting Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cit. 2002) (internal quotation
marks omitted)).
122 Id. at 1100-01.
123 Id. at 1100.
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provided Rockstar with expertise or support in making the game, (2) that E.S.S.
had entered the video game industry, or (3) that Rockstar operated strip
124
clubs.
The approach taken by the Ninth Circuit to determine whether Rockstar
Games's use was explicitly misleading appeared to invoke the traditional
likelihood of confusion test, though the court never formally applied the
confusion factors used by the Ninth Circuit. 25 The district court explicitly
declined to take this approach. 126 While the district court did engage in some
likelihood of confusion analysis, 127 it appears to have done so to compare the
case to the facts in Rogers v. Grimaldi, where the unauthorized use posed a
greater risk of consumer confusion but was nonetheless protected under the
First Amendment. 128 In affirming the district court's decision, the Ninth Circuit
expressed no opinion regarding the rationale employed by the district court and
the likelihood of confusion analysis supplied by the Ninth Circuit was brief,
129
even in comparison to that provided by the district court.
3. Post-E.S.S. Entertainment Confusion. The district court decisions following
E.S.S. have exhibited confusion regarding the application of the Rogers test. The
court in Roxbugy Entertainment v. Penthouse Media Group, Inc.130 applied the Rogers
test to a case involving the use of a trademark in the title and packaging of a
pornographic film.131 The court quoted the language from E.S.S. that the
second prong of Rogers involves an inquiry into "whether consumers would be
misled about the source or sponsorship of Defendants' movie." However, it
did not engage in an involved likelihood of confusion analysis, stating only that
use alone in a tide could not constitute explicit misleading under MCA Records
132
and that no other evidence of consumer confusion existed.

124

Id.at 1100-01.

125

See id. (addressing whether the use was artistically relevant and explicitly misleading without

applying the factors from the Ninth Circuit).
126 E.S.S. Entm't 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 444 F. Supp. 2d 1012, 1045 (C.D. Cal. 2006)
("[W]hen First Amendment interests are implicated, the Rogers 'explicitly misleading' standard
applies, not the traditional 'likelihood of confusion' test." (citing MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 900)).
127 Id. at 1046-48.
128 See id.at 1048 ("The likelihood of confusion in Rogers v. Gnimad was far greater than here for
there were no visible signs accompanying the title to show consumers that the movie was not in
fact about Rogers and Astaire. Nonetheless the court found that the First Amendment interests
prevailed.").
129 E.S.S. Entm't 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100-01.
130 Roxbury Entm't v. Penthouse Media Grp., Inc., 669 F. Supp. 2d 1170 (C.D. Cal. 2009).
131Id.at 1175-76.
132 Id. at 1176 (citing MCA Records, 296 F.3d at 902).
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In contrast, the court in Rebelution, LLC v. Pere 33 applied both the cultural
significance test from Walking Mountain and the likelihood of confusion test
wholesale in a trademark dispute over the use of the word rebelution.134 In
Rebelution, the plaintiff, a reggae band called Rebelution, sued a hip-hop and
Latin dance artist operating under the moniker Pitbull, for using the word
rebelution in the title of an album. 135 The court rejected the defendant's motion
for summary judgment on First Amendment grounds, stating that the word
rebelution had no cultural significance under Walking Mountain or MCA Records,
precluding application of the Rogers test.' 36 The court distinguished E.S.S. by
stating that, while the mark at issue in E.S.S. was not culturally significant, the
1 37
parties in that case "did not dispute whether the Rogers test was applicable."'
The court also argued that application of the Rogers test was inappropriate under
the language of Rogers itself, which applied the Lanham Act in its entirety to
cases of misleading artistic tides. 138 Determining whether a title is misleading,
and thus beyond the scope of the Rogers test, the court reasoned, required
139
analysis under the traditional likelihood of confusion test.
Even if the Rogers test applied, the court stated, the defendant would still be
liable under the first prong of the test because his use was not artistically
relevant 40 Furthermore, the court noted that "[i]n every federal court of
appeals case addressing the artistic adoption of plaintiff's non-generic mark, the
artistic relevance of defendant's use of the mark related to the meaning
associated with the plaintiffs mark."''
Since the defendant here had used the
term rebelution without intending to reference (or even knowing that it could
reference) the plaintiff reggae band, the use could not satisfy the artistic
relevance prong of the Rogers test. 142 Having dispensed with the Rogers test as
inapplicable, the court proceeded with a lengthy analysis of the facts under the
traditional likelihood of confusion test. 143 The court ultimately found sufficient

133 Rebelution, LLC v. Perez, 732 F. Supp. 2d 883 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
134 Id.at 887-99.
135 Id.at 885-86.
136

Id. at 887-88.

137 Id.at 888 (citing E.S.S., 547 F.3d at 1099-1100).
138 Id.
139

Id.

140 Id. at 888-89.
141

Id at 889.

Id. ("[Defendant] concedes that prior to releasing his album, he had never heard of plaintiff.
Instead, [he] adopted the word rebelution because he saw it on a store front in Miami ..
(citations omitted)).
143 Id. at 890-98.
142
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likelihood of confusion to preclude the defendant's motion for summary
judgment. 144
The Rebelulion court's application of the Rogers test came under fire less than
45
a year later in Stewart Surjboards, Inc. v. Disney Book Group, LLC.1
In Stewart, the
plaintiff surfboard manufacturer relied heavily on Rebelution in response to the
defendant's motion to dismiss in a case involving the depiction of a Stewart
Surfboard on the back cover of a book entitled Hannah Montana: Rock the
Waves.146 The plaintiff cited Rebelution to argue that the Stewart Surfboard logo
did not possess the requisite cultural significance to warrant the application of
the Rogers test.147 The Stewart court rejected this defense and the reasoning
employed in Rebelution, arguing that the exact same defense had been considered
and rejected in E.S.S.148 That the parties in E.S.S. did not dispute the
applicability of the Rogers test was irrelevant, and distinguishing on such a basis
misinterpreted the holding in E.S.S. 149 The Stewart court thus determined that
150
the Rogers test was applicable.
The plaintiff in Stewart argued that even if the Rogers test was applicable, the
defendant's use was not artistically relevant because it did not refer to the
meaning associated with the Stewart trademark, again citing Rebelution.'5' The
Stewart court rejected this argument as well, citing E.S.S. for the principle that
the artistic relevance need only "be above zero." 15 2 The use here met this
threshold because the mark evoked the surfing theme reflected in the plot of
3
the book.15
The court then moved to the second prong of the Rogers test, determining
whether the use explicitly mislead as to the source or content of the work.Is4
The court conceded that "[t]he case law [was] not entirely clear on what it
means for the use of a trademark to 'explicitly mislead[]' as to the work's
144

Id.at 899.

145 Stewart Surfboards, Inc. v. Disney Book Grp., LLC, No. CV 10-2982 GAF (SSx), 2011 U.S.

Dist. LEXIS 155444, at "5-11 (C.D. Cal. May 11, 2011).
146 Id. at "1, *5.
147 Id. at *5.
148 Id. at *7-9.
149 Id. at *8 ("The Rebelution court ignored this aspect of E.S.S. Entertainmentand concluded that
it was inapposite because 'the parties there did not dispute whether the Rogers test was applicable.'
In this Court's view, that misapprehends E.S.S. Entertainment." (quoting Rebelution, LLC v. Perez,
732 F. Supp. 2d 883, 888 (N.D. Cal. 2010))).
150 Id. at *11.
151 Id.at *12-13.
152 Id. at *13 (quoting E.S.S. Ent'mt 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Video, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100
(9th Cir. 2008)).
153 Id. at *13-14.
154 Id. at *20-28.
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source or content, or whether that assessment [could] properly be made on a
motion to dismiss."' 55 If the second prong of the Rogers test required the
traditional likelihood of confusion test, dismissal would be inappropriate given
the fact-intensive nature of the inquiry. 156 Given the confused state of the
explicitly misleading test in the Ninth Circuit, and absent any circuit statement
that the Rogers test could not be applied on a motion to dismiss, the Stewart
court ultimately determined that dismissal was appropriate in this case, adopting
the "original Rogers approach in which a work is 'explicitly misleading' only if it
contains an 'explicit indication,' 'overt claim,' or 'explicit misstatement.' "157
In contrast, a recent denial of dismissal by a district court overseeing
ongoing litigation between Electronic Arts and Textron employed language
from E.S.S. in seemingly adopting the likelihood of confusion test to determine
whether a use was explicitly misleading under the Rogers test. l5 8 The dispute
involved Electronic Arts's unauthorized depiction of Textron's trademarked
military helicopters in a video game. 159 Electronic Arts moved to dismiss on
nominative fair use and First Amendment grounds.160 In denying Electronic
Arts's motion to dismiss on First Amendment grounds, the district court
focused on the explicitly misleading prong of the Rogers test.' 61 While
Electronic Arts argued that the likelihood of confusion factor was inapplicable
in a Rogers test determination the district court disagreed. 62 The district court
cited E.S.S., noting that the Ninth Circuit had "looked at 'whether the Game
would confuse its players into thinking that the Play Pen was somehow behind
the Pig Pen or that it sponsor[ed] Rockstar's product' when it evaluated"
whether the use was explicitly misleading.163 Unlike inE.S.S., where the Ninth
Circuit had determined that no reasonable consumer would think E.S.S. had
provided Rockstar with the expertise and knowledge in depicting their strip
club, 164 here the district court determined that, while consumers might not
reasonably believe that Textron made video games, they could plausibly believe
*20-21 (third alteration in original) (quoting E.S.S. 547 F.3d at 1099).
156 Id.at *22-23.
157 Id.at *24-25.
158Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion to Dismiss Counterclaims, Granting in Part and Denying
in Part Plaintiffs Request for Judicial Notice, and Vacating Hearing, Elec. Arts, Inc. v. Textron
Inc., No. C 12-00118 WHA, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 103914 (N.D. Cal. July 25, 2012).
159 Id.
at *2-5.
160 Id.at *3-5.
161Id.
at *8-9.
162 Id.at *11.
163 Id.(quoting E.S.S. Entm't 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1100 (9th Cir.
155 Id.at

2008)).
164Id.(quoting E.S.S., 547 F.3d at 1100-01).
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that Textron was somehow behind or sponsored the game. 165 The court cited a
number of factors supporting a likelihood of confusion, including the
prominence of the helicopters in the game and the ability of the consumer to
control the helicopters while playing the game. 166 The case was later dismissed
167
after the parties reached an undisclosed settlement.
Two recent cases show that the confusion surrounding the Rogers test
persists in the Ninth Circuit. In Wlebcekb, Inc. v. P6-(G,168 the court granted
defendant P&G's motion for summary judgment, employing the Rogers test
without analyzing the likelihood of confusion factors. 169 While the plaintiff
claimed that the trademark in question (the Web Celeb name) was not culturally
significant enough to warrant Rogers test protection, the Webceleb court
70
determined that E.S.S. had explicitly rejected this requirement.
In contrast, the court in Warner Brothers Entertainment v. GlobalA.ylm, Inc.
applied the cultural significance requirement to the Rogers test in granting a
temporary restraining order in a dispute over the "Hobbit" trademark. 171 In
Warner Brothers, defendant Global Asylum, a company known for producing socalled "mockbusters," cheaper parodies of major films, sought to release a film
documenting the recently discovered prehistoric humans that had lived in
Indonesia. 72 The film was entitled "Age of Hobbits," referring -to the
nickname given to the prehistoric people by the scientists who had discovered
them.173 The movie was set to release on December 11, 2012.174
As luck would have it, Warner Brothers planned to release a film entitled The
Hobbit: An Unexpected Journey three days later on December 14, 2012.175 This
movie did not, however, reference the prehistoric people of Indonesia, instead
depicting the well-known story written by J.R.R. Tolkien. 176 Concerned that the
165
166

Id.at *12.
Id.at *11-12 (internal quotation marks omitted).

167 Case settkd Ekctronic Arts v. Textron, Inc., PATENT ARCADE, http://www.patentarcade.com/
2013/08/case-settled-electronic-arts-v-textron.htm (last visited Oct. 10, 2013).
168Webceleb, Inc. v. P&G, No. 10-2318, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188117, at *1 (S.D. Cal. Sept.
25, 2012).

169 Id. at *6-7 ("In the Ninth Circuit, the traditional test for trademark infringement is the
'likelihood of confusion' test .... Consideration of [the likelihood of confusion factors],
however, may not be appropriate or necessary in all cases of alleged trademark infringement.').
170 Id. at *15.
171Warner Bros. Entm't Inc. v. Global Asylum, Inc., No. 12-9547, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
185695, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2012).
172 Id. at *3.
173 Id.

174 Id. at *2.
175 Id.
176 Id.
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marketing and release date of "Age of Hobbits" would confuse potential
viewers interested in their film, Warner Brothers sought a temporary restraining
order preventing Global Asylum from releasing their movie with the word
177
"hobbits" in the title.
In order to grant this request, the court had to determine whether Warner
Brothers could show a likelihood of success on their trademark infringement
claim. 178 The court immediately launched into a detailed analysis of the
likelihood of confusion factors, finding that the factors weighed in favor of
Warner Brothers1 79 The court then considered Global Asylum's defenses,
80
including a Rogers test defense.
In evaluating Global Asylum's Rogers test defense, the court first
characterized the test as having three prongs, citing MCA Records and
Rebe/ufion.' 8' This third prong requirement limits the Rogers test to marks that
have "acquired meaning beyond [their] source-identifying function," tracking
the cultural significance requirements derived from MCA Records and Walking
Mountain.182 The court determined that the "Hobbit" mark was sufficiently
183
culturally significant to warrant Rogers test protection.
However, in considering the artistic relevance prong of the test, the court
imported the requirement from Rebe/ution that the artistic relevance of the mark
must be related to the original meaning associated with the mark.' 84 Since the
use of the term "hobbit" in Global Asylum's film referenced prehistoric
Indonesians instead of the small-folk in Tolkien's novels, the court held that
Global Asylum's use of the mark was not artistically relevant to the work under
85
the Rogers test.
The court went on to conclude that Asylum's use failed the explicitly
misleading prong of the test as well, since the likelihood of confusion analysis
had produced a "particularly compelling" likelihood of confusion. 186 After
dispensing with Global Asylum's other defenses, including nominative fair use,
the court granted Warner Brothers the temporary restraining order. 87 While
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the Ninth Circuit affirmed, only the nominative fair use issue was presented on
188
appeal.
III. ANALYSIS
A. WHY THE ROGERS TEST MATTERS

Confusion over how best to apply the Rogers test within the Ninth Circuit
has occurred in two primary areas. The first concerns the proper role of the
traditional likelihood of confusion test within the Rogers test.1 89 Courts have
long struggled with this question, and it is far from unique to the Ninth
Circuit.1 90 The second point of confusion involves the development of the
cultural significance requirement from MCA Records and Walking Mountain, as
well as the requirement derived from Rebelution and GlobalAqylum that a mark's
use must reference the original meaning of the related mark.' 91 These two
requirements are unique to the Ninth Circuit and are more recent developments
in the Rogers test.
As the preceding district court cases have shown, how courts construe the
Rogers test can have an important impact on the outcome of trials. Electronic
Arts's motion to dismiss would likely have succeeded under the interpretation
of the test employed by the court in Stewart Surfboards, as Electronic Arts never
included an "explicit indication, overt claim, or explicit misstatement" in
depicting the helicopters. 192 Conversely, the heightened limitations placed on
the test by the Rebelulion and Global Asylum courts favor markholders and will
typically require an extensive discovery period due to the fact-intensive nature
of the likelihood of confusion inquiry, potentially resulting in longer litigation
even if the creator of an expressive work ultimately prevails in a case.
However, the differing interpretations of the Rogers test within the Ninth
Circuit are problematic beyond case-by-case decisions. Legal uncertainty over

188 Warner Bros. Entm't, Inc. v. Global Asylum, Inc., No. 13-55352, 2013 U.S. App. LEXIS
22120, at *2 (9th Cir. Oct. 30, 2013).
189 See Webceleb., 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 188117, at *6-7 (stating that a likelihood of confusion
analysis is not necessary in every instance).
190 David M. Kelly & Lynn M. Jordan, Tweno Years of Rogers v. Grimaldi: Balandng the Lanham
Act with the First Amendment Rights of Creators of Artistic Works, 99 TRADEMARK REP. 1360, 1383
(1999).
191See GlobalAylmm, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185695, at *48-49 (importing the Rebelution court's
requirement that the artistic relevance of the mark must be related to the mark's original
meaning).
192 Stewart Surfboards, Inc. v. Disney Book Grp., LLC, No. CV 10-2982 GAF (SSx), 2011 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 155444, at *25 (C.D. Cal. May 11,2011) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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the scope of trademark protection in the context of expressive works risks
creating a chilling effect by discouraging content creators from using marks that
they may otherwise be entitled to use. While a definitive answer either way
from the Ninth Circuit may help remove legal uncertainty, a number of factors
render the use of the likelihood of confusion factors within the Rogers test
unappealing.
B. A CONFUSING TEST FOR CONFUSION

1. Factors and Ham. Trademark law and the likelihood of confusion test are
rooted in judicial attempts at discouraging unfair business practices and passingoff claims. 193 In this commercial context, rooting the infringement test to
evidence of consumer confusion is appropriate. The factors commonly
employed by courts to gauge the presence of consumer confusion function well
when applied to products near each other on store shelves. 94 Consumer
confusion in such cases goes to the heart of a passing-off claim-that a mark is
being used to mislead consumers as to the origin of a good in order to compete
with the rightful markholder. In passing-off claims both the markholder and
the consumer are harmed. Markholders lose sales from confused customers
who believe they are buying the right product. Consumers are deceived into
purchasing items they do not want or are forced to incur higher transaction
costs in purchasing items they do want. In either case, consumer confusion is
directly tied to demonstrable harms.
For all of its utility in the commercial sales context, the likelihood of
confusion test is ill-equipped to resolve claims involving infringement in
expressive works, even ignoring the First Amendment concerns implicated by
the test. This is because many of the factors commonly included in likelihood
of confusion tests are simply irrelevant in the context of expressive works.
While consumer confusion in the commercial context is chiefly concerned with
confusion as to the origin of a marked good, trademark uses in expressive
works rarely confuse consumers as to the origin of the work since few
companies branch out into creating purely expressive works. 195 No reasonable

193 Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 28-29 (2003); Bently, supra
note 17; McKenna, supra note 17.
194 See AMF, Inc. v. Sleekcraft Boats, 599 F.2d 341, 348-49 (9th Cir. 1979), abrogatedin part on
other grounds by Mattel, Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792 (9th Cir. 2003) (including
the proximity or relationship between the goods being sold, the similarity of the trademarks, the
strength of the plaintiff's mark, the existence of survey evidence of actual confusion, etc.).
195 See Mattel, Inc. v. MCA Records, Inc., 296 F.3d 894, 902 (9th Cir. 2002) (describing how
trademark use in titles seldom refer to origin).
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consumer would believe that Textron or E.S.S. Entertainment had branched
out into the video game industry, or that Mattel produced and sold surreal
photographs featuring their Barbie doll. Likewise, while the similarity of the
offending mark may prove important in cases of commercial passing-off, the
similarity of the mark in an expressive work is almost a given. The entire point
of using a mark in an expressive work is to invoke the commonly understood
cultural meanings or values associated with the mark.
The scope and magnitude of the harm alleged in expressive work cases also
differs significantly from those in the commercial sales context. By permitting
markholders to bring passing-off claims, the Lanham Act empowers the
markholder to protect not only itself, but also the consumer from demonstrable
harm. However, the harms involved in expressive work cases are more difficult
to discern. While a consumer may be led to wrongly believe that the
markholder approved or sponsored the use of a mark in an expressive work, it
is not clear in all cases that such a belief results in any real harm to the
For the markholder, the most straightforward danger of
consumer.
unauthorized use in the context of expressive works-that the use will
somehow impugn or portray the brand in a negative light-is not even
addressed by the likelihood of confusion test. Indeed, many markholders will
bring suit even where the use has portrayed their mark in a positive or, at worst,
neutral light. In many such cases, the dispute actually stems from the
markholder's lost licensing fees, a very different sort of harm from the unfair
competition claims that the likelihood of confusion test was designed to
address.
While a proven and effective tool for deciding traditional commercial
trademark infringement cases, the traditional likelihood of confusion test is a
blunt instrument to apply in the expressive works context. The fundamental
assumptions made by the likelihood of confusion test-that consumer
confusion works concrete harms on consumers and the manufacturers--do not
necessarily apply in the context of expressive works, rendering the test less
effective at gauging whether an unauthorized use of a mark is explicitly
misleading in such cases.
2. Weighing the Interests. The Rogers test, as originally conceived, provided two
prongs that defined when the public interest in free speech outweighed the
rights granted to markholders. 196 If an unauthorized use of a mark failed this
test, the case would then proceed as in any other infringement case, applying
the likelihood of confusion factors to determine if infringement had occurred.
Applying the likelihood of confusion factors within the Rogers test renders the
196 Rogers v. Grimaldi, 875 F.2d 994, 999 (2d Cir. 1989).
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test singularly unhelpful in determining what weight should be given to the
public interest in free speech.
If, for example, the likelihood of confusion test employed within the Rogers
test is the same as that used for commercial infringement cases, then the Rogers
test serves no purpose; an unauthorized use that fails under the traditional
likelihood of confusion test will always fail the Rogers test. Even if the
likelihood of confusion test employed within the Rogers test factors in the public
interest in free speech by requiring plaintiffs to show evidence of greater
confusion than would suffice in a traditional commercial infringement case, the
degree of any increased evidentiary burden would be subject to judicial
discretion, since the Rogers test itself provides no guidance on the matter.
While courts are certainly capable of applying balancing tests, doing so in the
context of free speech is particularly worrisome. The public interest in free
speech extends beyond concerns over the outcomes of individual trials.
Unnecessary confusion within the law risks a chilling effect that may be just as
damaging to the public interest as a straightforward law construing trademark
protections strongly in favor of markholders.
Absent a definitive ruling on whether a court will apply the likelihood of
confusion test in an infringement case, risk-averse content creators are
encouraged to assume the worst and prospectively apply the likelihood of
confusion factors. 197 While prospectively applying the likelihood of confusion
test might allow content creators to assess whether a court will find their use of
a trademark overly confusing, it does not provide any insight as to the relative
weight of the public interest in free expression that might protect their use even
if it presents a likelihood of confusion.
The considerable difficulty in determining whether an unauthorized use of a
trademark in an artistic work will be protected creates a strong incentive for
risk-averse content creators to either pay licensing fees to the markholder or
just avoid unauthorized trademark uses entirely, even where such uses would
likely not constitute infringement. Those content creators who do go forward
with the unauthorized use of a trademark risk potentially lengthy and expensive
litigation due to the fact-intensive nature of the likelihood of confusion test,
even if they ultimately prevail in the case.
3. Warped Incentives. In contrast, the application of the likelihood of
confusion test in the context of creative works encourages markholders to
vigorously defend their marks. Since the likelihood of confusion test links

197 E.S.S. Entm't 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099 (9th Cir. 2008)
(quoting Mattel Inc. v. Walking Mountain Prods., 353 F.3d 792, 807 (9th Cir. 2003) (internal
quotations marks omitted)).
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trademark infringement to consumer confusion, determining whether
infringement has occurred will depend, to some degree, on consumers'
knowledge of trademark law. If consumers believe that certain uses of marks
always require authorization from the markholder, consumers will infer a
markholder's authorization from the presence of the mark, expanding the
definition of infringement under the Lanham Act.' 98 Indeed, plaintiffs in
trademark infringement cases will frequently use consumer surveys as evidence
of confusion. 199 This evidence can prove particularly compelling since most
courts consider survey results to be evidence of actual consumer confusion, as
opposed to evidence presenting the mere "likelihood of confusion" that the
200
Lanham Act requires.
By vigorously asserting their trademark rights, markholders take advantage
of the unclear nature of the law, which encourages authors and publishers to
either pay licensing fees to foreclose liability or avoid unauthorized uses of
marks entirely.201 As consumers become accustomed to licensing and product
placement practices, they become conditioned to assume that any such uses of a
trademark require the permission of the markholder, even absent any contextual
evidence of markholder sponsorship or approval in the use itself.20 2 This, in
turn, places markholders in a better position for future cases that are predicated
on a showing of consumer confusion. The result is a steady expansion of
markholder protection into an area traditionally dominated by free speech
20 3
interests without any substantive change in trademark law.
C. REFOCUSING THE TEST

The Rogers test, as originally conceived and as applied in Stewart Sudboards,
provides, at the very least, a straightforward and understandable test for
determining whether the public interest in free speech will protect an
198 See 3 J. THOMAS McCARTHY, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETITION 5 24.03[4][b] (3d ed.
1992) ("If consumers think that most uses of a trademark require authorization, then in fact they
will require authorization because the owner can enjoin consumer confusion caused by
unpermitted uses or charge for licenses. And if owners can sue to stop unauthorized uses, then
only authorized uses will be seen by consumers, creating or reinforcing their perception that
authorization is necessary. This is a 'chicken and the egg' conundrum.').
199 See Edward George Epstein, Surveys: Growing AdmisEibility but Narrow Ulization,. 83
TRADEMARK REP. 863 (1993) (documenting history of survey evidence in trademark cases).
20 See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp. 2d 1013, 1040 (C.D. Cal. 1998) (explaining the
significance of survey results that demonstrate varying percentages of confusion).
201 See generaly James Gibson, Risk Aversion and Righls Accreion in Intellectual Property Law, 116
YALE L.J. 882, 907-27 (2007) (describing the "feedback loop" of consumer confusion in detail).
202 Id. at 907-08.
203 Id. at 908.
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unauthorized use of a mark. The significant modifications to the original test
implemented by the Second and Fifth Circuits and the confusion currently
surrounding the Ninth Circuit's implementation suggest a degree of judicial
discomfort with the test.
The restrictions placed on the test by the Rebeluiion and GlobalAylum courts
are particularly telling. The E.S.S. decision appeared to do away with the
cultural significance requirement sketched out in Walking Mountain.20 4 And yet
the requirement persists in some district courts, with the GlobalAylum court
going so far as to include it as a third prong in the test.205 The only justification
provided by the Rebelulion court for this requirement was a rather strained
reading of E.S.S. that effectively assumed that the E.S.S. court had ignored the
cultural significance requirement because the parties had agreed that the Rogers
test was applicable.20 6 The GlobalAglum court did not even address E.S.S. on
207
this issue, citing instead MCA Records and Rebelution.
The requirement that a use demonstrate artistic relevance referencing the
meaning associated with the plaintiffs mark likewise restricts application of the
test. This requirement, applied by both the Rebelution and GlobalAgylum courts,
further narrows the artistic relevance requirement of the test. Detailed
justification for this heightened requirement remains scarce, however. The
Rebelution court, which first applied this requirement, provided no rationale
grounded in the purpose of the Rogers test or the Lanham Act, merely opining
that "in every federal court of appeals case [applying the Rogers test], the artistic
relevance of the defendant's use related to the meaning associated with the
plaintiff's mark." 20s The GlobalAylum court repeated this assertion, but also
cited E.S.S. in support, seemingly suggesting that the E.S.S. court had not
209
applied the Rogers test in deciding that case.
Some of the apparent judicial unease in applying a Stewart Suifboards-style
Rogers test may stem from its broadly permissive nature, which greatly expands
the ability of content creators to use marks without permission. In some cases,
such as ElectronicArts and Westchester Media, application of the Rogers test as
originally conceived seemingly permits content creators to steal a mark or

204 E.S.S. Entm't 2000, Inc. v. Rock Star Videos, Inc., 547 F.3d 1095, 1099-1100 (9th Cir.

2008).
205 Warner Bros. Entm't Inc. v. Global Asylum, Inc., No. 12-9547, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
185695, at "1,*44-45 (C.D. Cal. Dec. 10, 2012).
206 Rebelution, LLC v. Perez, 732 F. Supp. 2d 883, 888 (N.D. Cal. 2010).
207 GlobalAylum, 2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185695, at *44-45.
208 Rebeluion, 732 F. Supp. 2d at 889.
209 GlobalAsylum,2012 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 185695, at *46-48.
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design and profit from it without providing any compensation to the original
markholder.
While this sort of free riding may appear unfair on the surface, trademark
law, unlike patent and copyright law, is rooted in the Commerce Clause is thus
concerned with creating a legal framework encouraging the efficient flow of
commerce. 210 Patent law protects inventors from free riding because no
inventor would endeavor to spend the time and money to create something
only to have it copied and sold as soon as it was perfected. While creating and
(especially) branding a trademark certainly involves an investment of resources,
the core benefits of establishing a mark (market recognition and brand appeal)
are not suddenly lost when a content creator uses the mark in an expressive
work. Indeed, the use itself generally signals that the trademark has successfully
made its way into the social consciousness of the public. Unlike inventions,
companies will continue to register and develop trademarks in the absence of
laws preventing free riding. Attempts to discourage free riding should take the
form of clearer articulations of the rights held by markholders, not of further
confusion regarding what is or is not an explicitly misleading use of a mark.
IV.

CONCLUSION

Despite more than twenty years of applying the Rogers test, confusion
remains over how, exactly, the test operates. As a complete defense to Lanham
Act infringement claims, the Rogers test effectively sets the balance between the
The
public interest in free speech and the interests of markholders.
contours
the
exact
concerning
Ninth
Circuit
within
the
considerable confusion
of the test reflects the changing nature of trademarks in contemporary society,
which have developed beyond their role as source-indicators to take on greater
cultural significance.
Determining how best to balance the public interest in free speech against
the rights of markholders presents a daunting task. While the Rogers test as
originally conceived arguably sets the balance in favor of free speech interests, it
at least presents a consistent and relatively straightforward test for courts and
litigants to apply. The current confusion gripping the Ninth Circuit, and the
decision of some district courts to embed the traditional likelihood of confusion
test for infringement within the Rogers test, needlessly complicates the law by
incentivizing litigation by markholders and discouraging the use of marks by
content creators.

210

See supra notes 36-39.
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The evolution of trademarks from purely commercial designations of source
to powerful brands and symbols has put greater stress on a legal framework
focused on minimizing consumer confusion in the marketplace. Any decision
clarifying the position of the Rogers test within the Ninth Circuit will have a large
impact on the type of artistic expression available to the public in the future and
may inform future courts in their struggle to balance free speech against
trademark protection.
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